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1. Introduction  
 In  1956, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru addressed fellow citizens at the site of 
the first Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) by suggesting that “…here…stands this fine 
monument of India, IIT, today representing India‟s urges, India‟s future in the making.” 
The problem of development was for Nehru, as it was for policymakers and scholars, 
rooted in an economy‟s ability to close technology gaps. Then, as now, the stylized facts 
of the global distribution of technology divide the world into two broad groups. On the 
one hand, less developed economies are considered imitators, seeking to catch up by 
learning from the extant knowledge produced abroad. Meanwhile, advanced economies 
play the role of innovators, extending the frontier by producing new and better goods and 
services.  
 Although this anecdote of a technology „race‟ between imitation and innovation 
remains with us today, contemporary researchers have significantly refined our 
understanding of its dynamics. Notwithstanding some formal modeling in which 
technology is assumed to be a global public good, many economists today recognize that 
technology varies from place to place, and that it is a vital determinant of differences in 
economic wellbeing. Endogenous growth theorists posit general equilibrium models in 
which technological inputs, such as human capital and research and development (R&D) 
drive an economy‟s overall growth rate (Aghion & Howitt 1992; Lucas 1986; Romer 
1986). Economic geographers contend that there are significant transaction costs 
associated with the dissemination of new or nonroutine knowledge. These drive the 
locational concentration of economic activity, and they are a primary reason why 
investments in knowledge do not spill frictionlessly from place to place (Glaeser et al 
1992; Storper & Venables 2004). In a complementary sense, economic historians and 
evolutionary economists argue that gaps persist because the diffusion of technology is far 
from automatic. Developing country firms expend great effort to adopt existing 
technologies, a process that calls for learning and adaptation, and which relies on 
institutions beyond the boundaries of the atomized firm, much like innovation itself (Lall 
1992; Pavitt & Bell 1992; Viotti 2002). 
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 The theme of a race between latecomers‟ imitation and leaders‟ innovation also has 
new currency in the context of contemporary globalization. Many people in advanced 
economies are increasingly anxious that Nehru‟s hopes for his country have finally been 
realized, as latecomers like India and China expand their role in the global economy. Are 
these countries truly approaching world-class levels of technological advancement? 
Generalizing from these two oft-cited success stories, have information technology and 
global trade at last removed the hurdles that once obstructed latecomers from joining the 
club of advanced economies? 
To be sure, the current period of globalization presents new possibilities for 
economies seeking to close technology gaps. Information technology, cheap transport, 
production fragmentation, rising foreign investment and intensified trade provide new or 
enhanced channels through which technology may be disseminated from advanced to 
developing economies (Blomström & Kokko 1998; Girma 2005; Keller 1997). But 
globalization‟s effect on technology gaps is ambiguous. Trade theory from Ricardo 
forward instructs that the expansion of trade drives greater specialization. For advanced 
economies this likely means more dedicated focus on goods, services and tasks that 
demand complex, non-routinized know-how. Economic geographers suggest that what 
makes these activities hard to codify also renders them less imitable, hence they are not 
easily contestable by low-cost producers (Leamer 2007; Storper 1997). In other words, 
the newly refined comparative advantage of advanced economies may stubbornly resist 
being offshored. Over the long run, advanced economies‟ deepening specialization may 
also set off circular and cumulative gains to technology. Perhaps it is building a 
foundation on which new, uncodified ideas are continually added, permitting today‟s 
technological leaders to perpetually outrun their imitators. 
 Despite the central importance to questions of development and globalization, we 
have of the little systematic evidence that we need to evaluate changes in international 
technology gaps. Technology is latent in the economy, embodied in products and 
services, making it hard to measure. We do have indications that countries vary in their 
total factor productivity (TFP), and that these differences are related to economic growth 
(Easterly & Levine 2001; Hall & Jones 1999; Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare 1997a). 
However, there is no agreed upon way of evaluating technology‟s contribution to TFP 
(Prescott 1997). We also know that countries differ in their innovative effort. But R&D 
expenditures and patent counts are partial measures at best. They fail to capture 
technological efforts in the form of imitation and adaptation that dwarf innovative effort 
in advanced economies (Jovanovic 1995), and are plausibly much larger among the less 
sophisticated.  
In this paper I introduce a novel measure of technology, TECH, and use it to 
investigate the changing shape of international technology gaps. TECH evaluates an 
economy‟s overall technology level based on the products it exports, as function of three 
components. First, each product is assigned an „implied sophistication‟ score, based on 
the revealed comparative advantage-weighted income level of its exporters, following 
Hausmann et al (2007). A product‟s implied sophistication will increase as high-income 
economies become progressively more specialized in its export. Second, following recent 
evidence that highlights the importance of intra-product differentiation (Hummels & 
Klenow 2002; Schott 2004), I assign a relative quality level to each economy‟s export of 
a good, using unit prices to compare it to its direct competitors. Third, the product of 
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these two methods is combined with the share that each good occupies in each country‟s 
total exports, to arrive at the overall measure of an economy‟s technological 
sophistication, TECH. 
I analyze annual changes in as many as 141 countries‟ levels of technological 
sophistication over the recent period of globalization, 1972-2001, and ask three main 
questions. First, have international technology gaps grown or shrunk? Second, what are 
the prospects for intradistributional mobility over the period studied: are economies 
„stuck‟ in the relative positions in which they began, or do they make pronounced leaps 
forward and back? Third, is there evidence that economies that manage to leap forward 
do so for common reasons, in terms of changes in quality, implied productivity, and new 
product introductions? 
My findings can be easily summarized.  First, patterns of international technology 
gaps are complex, and irreducible to simple conclusion of convergence of divergence. 
However, technology‟s leading edge has expanded faster than low and moderately 
sophisticated economies have grown, consistent with an overall increase in the gap 
between technological haves and have-nots. Second, country technological positions are 
roughly stable over time. Most economies did not leap from one broad level of 
sophistication to another between 1972 and 2001. Moreover, it is the most sophisticated 
economies that most significantly upgraded the sophistication of their exports over the 
period studied. Third, the decomposition of country-group contributions to changes in 
TECH reveals that there are meaningful groups of countries that have upgraded in similar 
ways. Initial leaders grew primarily by consistent export of the same goods, but 
increasing the levels of quality and implied productivity, and with more dedicated focus. 
Meanwhile, less developed economies upgraded their TECH levels primarily by adding 
new and more sophisticated goods that they did not produce in earlier periods. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I briefly review theories that 
relate technology and economic growth, and describe empirical approaches that 
researchers take to measure economy-wide technology levels. In Section 3 I outline my 
empirical specification of TECH, and describe the data used. Section 4 presents empirical 
results. I conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Growth and Technology 
Technologies are rules and ideas that direct the way goods are created. They are 
codified in formal blueprints or tacitly held by individuals alone or in groups. Despite 
what we know from history - that technology is scarce, prized and competed for - 
orthodox economic models assume it is universally and freely available. Solow‟s (1956) 
workhorse neoclassical growth model supposes that only differences in physical capital 
accumulation explain the wealth of some countries and the poverty of others. 
Technological progress is vital in this model as a driver of the overall growth rate, but it 
is assumed that new techniques are instantly available to everyone.  
Growth rates are inversely related to initial income, creating welfare effects as 
follows. Poor countries are capital-scarce, and the addition of capital provides these 
economies with a relatively greater growth stimulus than to the rich, because of 
decreasing returns. Poor countries thus grow faster than capital-abundant, wealthy 
economies. In the long run, rich and poor countries‟ per capita GDP growth rates 
converge, though this convergence does not necessarily lead to international equality in 
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per capita incomes. 
 The predictions of the Solow model are odds with empirics. Not only is there little 
evidence of absolute income convergence, countries appear to be clustering into distinct 
clubs based not on initial income, but on the basis of institutional and other factors 
(Chatterji 1992; Quah 1992). Contrary to the model‟s predictions, capital is not flowing 
rapidly towards poor economies to seize upon higher rates of return (Lucas 1990), while 
rates of return in the U.S. have remained high for a century (King & Rebelo 1993). 
Furthermore, additions to the stock of capital and labor contribute only a fraction – as 
little as 10% in some rigorous analyses - of measured growth in output (Klenow & 
Rodriguez-Clare 1997b).
2
 Total factor productivity (TFP) accounts for the residual, but 
TFP remains an exogenously determined black box. Most observers consider that 
technology accounts for some significant proportion of TFP, but we lack an accepted 
method for decomposing TFP, or even an accepted theory of its constituents (Prescott 
1997). Moreover, after controlling for differences in capital intensity and educational 
attainment, TFP‟s contribution to growth still varies across countries (Hall & Jones 1999; 
Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare 1997a). Assuming a global technology pool, Solow‟s model 
cannot account for why some economies remain more productive than others after 
considering these factors. 
 „New,‟ or „endogenous‟ growth models address some of these issues by rooting 
technological change or human capital accumulation in agents‟ profit-seeking decisions. 
According to these models, economies grow as firms seek gains through technological 
improvement or by increasing the stock of human capital. They drive technological 
change by investing in R&D (Aghion & Howitt 1992), and also by adopting and adapting 
existing technologies that are new to the organization (Jovanovic 1995). Agents also spur 
technological change through training and education (Lucas 1986; Romer 1986), and it 
can emerge from learning-by-doing (Arrow 1962). Technological advancements 
produced through these various efforts can diffuse between firms, across cities, regions 
and nations. Yet these spillovers cannot be frictionless otherwise there would be no 
incentive to invest in technology.  
 While differing in methods from general equilibrium-oriented endogenous growth 
theorists, economists taking historical and evolutionary perspectives on growth have long 
studied the obstacles that constrain the spread of technologies. The latter have 
demonstrated that technological adoption demands effort. Users of a technology often 
require specific human capital to make sense of it. Adoption consumes resources, as 
firms must license new technologies, and local adaptation may be required (Lall 1992). 
Moreover, learning, adaptation and innovation typically proceed from inter-
organizational interactions that are bound up in shared conventions regarding trust, time 
horizons, and rationality (Lundvall et al 2002). These processes have a tacit dimension 
that encumbers the dissemination of ideas, and creates distinctive evolutionary 
trajectories of technological development within spatial, social, political and sectoral 
boundaries (Malerba 2002; Nelson 1993; Saxenian 1996; Storper 1997; Viotti 2002). 
Frictions in technology diffusion thereby open the door to variation in sophistication 
within particular industries, and in aggregate between regional and national economies. 
                                                 
2
 By some estimates the addition of human capital to measures of capital accumulation can raise this 
fraction to as high as 80% Mankiw NG, Romer D, D.N. W. 1992. A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107:407-37 
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In turn these technology gaps explain persistent international income differences. 
 Globalization has likely altered the pace at which technologies are spread. 
Advances in communication technologies over the last decades of the 20
th
 century make 
it easier to share ideas, and they permit the formation of new kinds of social links across 
space. Deepening economic integration, in the form of growing impact of FDI and trade 
may also help to disseminate technologies. Under certain conditions, local agents 
accumulate new ideas and become more productive when foreign multinationals enter 
their markets (Blomström & Kokko 1998; Borensztein et al 1998; Xu 2000). Firms may 
also learn by importing and exporting (Keller 2002; Rivera-Batiz & Romer 1991). Hence, 
one likely force affecting the pace of diffusion is a dissemination effect, whereby 
communication technologies, trade, investment and cheap transportation hasten 
technological, and hence economic convergence. 
 However, these forces do not equally affect all technologies. Tacit ideas, meaning 
those to which we can apply Polanyi‟s aphorism: “we know more than we can tell” 
(Polanyi 1967), are not necessarily easier to exchange now than before. The City of 
London, Silicon Valley and other agglomerations premised on the circulation of 
nonroutine, tacit know how have not declined, though these locales have shed some 
activities and created new ones. Regional specialization is not on the wane in the „internet 
age‟ (Leamer & Storper 2001; Scott & Storper 2003), even while cycles of knowledge 
creation and destruction have been accelerated (Lundvall & Nielsen 1999). 
 Increasing integration and technological change together plausibly induce a 
deepening of the division of labor in which advanced economies increasingly focus on 
nonroutine tasks, while certain kinds of routine production are offshored to developing 
countries (Autor et al 2003; Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg 2006). In terms of 
technological diffusion, this means that technologies subject to codification are likely to 
diffuse much more rapidly than before through the channels described above, while tasks 
that require complex and less systematic technologies remain bound in agglomerations 
inside advanced economies. The rewards from specialization in high-sophistication goods 
and services may be such that advanced economies outrun the pace of imitation in 
developing economies. The deepening global division of labor may provide self-
perpetuating technological advantages to today‟s winners that reinforce existing 
technology gaps. 
 We need better empirics on technology to understand these issues. Technology 
measurement lags behind theory in part because technology is latent in the economy, 
embodied in products and tasks. Researchers have taken three main approaches to 
measuring technological differences. The first measures inputs and outputs into 
innovation. The second conflates TFP with technology. The third approach starts from 
the bottom up, gauging first the sophistication of individual products or industries and 
aggregating to the economy-wide level. 
 Inputs into innovation include expenditures on research and development (R&D) 
or dedicated human capital. Outputs include patents, bibliometrics, and counts of new 
product introductions. Each has strengths and weaknesses as indicators of innovation that 
have been widely discussed (Godin 2005; Griliches 1990; Pavitt 1984). But innovation 
and technology should not be conflated. By some estimates, R&D accounts for at most 
0.5% of U.S. productivity growth (Comin 2004), while firms in advanced economies 
spend 20 to 30 times more on adoption than invention (Jovanovic 1995). Both of these 
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estimates likely underemphasize the relative importance of adoption and adaptation in 
less developed countries where there is less innovation and scant formal R&D. 
 TFP measurement is straightforward, it makes use of widely available statistics, 
and flows directly from the neoclassical model. As discussed above however, TFP is also 
an undifferentiated amalgam of technological sophistication and other forces (Hulten 
2000). TFP‟s actual contribution to output may also be understated since technological 
changes likely induce further capital accumulation (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1995). 
Measures of capital accumulation therefore conceal technological change. Moreover, 
TFP‟s construction from aggregate price deflators may provide inaccurate results, since it 
ignores international variation in relative factor costs (Harrigan 1997).  
 Bottom-up approaches start by classifying individual products or industries 
according to their embodied technological sophistication. Product-level analyses provide 
needed granularity since industries are technologically variegated. Classifying an entire 
industry as „high-technology‟ may conceal many routine, low-technology products. 
Linking productivity to individual goods also helps to clarify TFP‟s black box. The 
central challenge with this approach is deciding on an effective and efficient manner by 
which to assign technology levels to goods. Economists commonly use R&D intensity to 
rank goods. Even if this were a generally sound approach, R&D figures are rarely 
systematically available for individual products.  
 A recent paper by Hausmann, Rodrik and Hwang (2007) addresses this issue by 
using widely available trade and income data to classify products on the basis of the 
average income level of their exporters, and then aggregates up to the national level.
3
 
Their index is relatively easy to construct, and uses detailed, disaggregated data. 
Nonetheless, exporters are increasingly specialized not simply in particular types of 
goods, but vertically differentiated within goods themselves on the basis of quality and 
other factors (Hummels & Klenow 2002; Schott 2004). Both Italy and China produce 
broadly analogous silk shirts, for example. But Italy‟s display higher craftsmanship, are 
more closely keyed to rapidly changing fashions, and involve more sophisticated 
branding. Xu (2007) demonstrates that the Hausmann et al (2007) measure significantly 
overstates China‟s recent increase in sophistication as compared to his approach that also 
considers relative price differences. Ideally then, we need a measure that describes 
technology levels not only on the basis of the type of products an economy exports, but 
also the quality or sophistication of these goods relative to those of competing producers. 
   
3. Empirical Framework 
3a. Construction of TECH 
 My TECH index builds on several approaches that describe the sophistication of 
economies by evaluating traded products. I make three main contributions. First, I refine 
Xu‟s (2007) use of unit prices to capture an additional technological dynamic by 
accounting for both extensive (between-products) and intensive (within-products) 
margins of technological upgrading. Second, I adapt the measure in Hausmann et al 
(2007) to account for changes in the sophistication of products themselves over time. 
Third, this permits me to build TECH using a significantly longer time-series, and hence 
to investigate long-term dynamics in the distribution. 
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TECH is a function of three product-level elements:  
(1) the implied productivity of the goods an economy exports (p),  
(2) the quality of those exports relative to those of direct competitors (q),  
(3) the value shares of each good in an economy‟s overall export basket 
(x).  





  (1) 
 
To build an identity for the implied productivity associated with an individual 
good, I calculate the average income of its exporters. Specifically, following Hausmann 
et al (2007), p (or PRODY) is a weighted-average of exporters‟ per capita GDP, where 
the weight is each exporter‟s revealed comparative advantage in the good being 
evaluated. My measure of implied productivity varies by product and year, but not by 
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 aggregates each exporter‟s value shares in product g. The procedure of weighting 
incomes by revealed comparative advantage is grounded in Ricardian theory that predicts 
the specialization patterns of an economy as a function of the goods it can produce most 
productively. Hence, we should expect rich countries to be highly specialized in 
sophisticated products, while poor economies specialize in unsophisticated goods. 
Revealed comparative advantage, since it is a relative measure, is also useful since it 
levels the playing field across countries of varying size. 
 To describe each exporter‟s position on a product quality ladder I construct an 
index of relative unit prices for each good. I consider that differences in importers‟ unit 
prices of a given product signal differences in quality levels. Following Xu (2007), I 
compare an economy‟s unit price to the unit prices of other countries‟ varieties, 
weighting the importance of prices on the basis of market share. If s is an economy‟s 
market share for good g, and u is its exporter‟s unit price, the relative price q of its 










A q score above 1 indicates that an exporters‟ variety occupies a favorable position on a 
quality ladder, while scores below 1 denote substandard quality. 
 The sum of the product of q, p and x across all goods in an economy‟s export 
basket produces a country-level TECH score in a given year. The product of q and p 
creates a country- and product-specific value that reflects both the average sophistication 
of the good across all exporters, and the particular exporter‟s quality ladder position for 
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this good. The product of these terms and x weights each product‟s sophistication score 
according to the relative intensity with which it is exported. Overall then, TECH 
evaluates the overall level of technological sophistication associated with a particular 
economy‟s exports. 
 
3b. Data Description 
I build annual TECH scores for 115 to 141 countries over the period 1972-2001, 
using data from two main sources. Income data, in the form of Chain-series per capita 
GDP, comes from Penn World Table (PWT), version 6.2 (Heston et al 2006). I use 
records of U.S. imports between 1972 and 2001 for product-level trade information. The 
U.S. Census Bureau records import information, which is compiled as part of a National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) project. Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2002) 
provides detailed documentation of the data. The database contains complete records of 
merchandise imports into the U.S. from 1972 to 2001. Each record describes the import 
into the U.S. of a single type of manufactured or natural resource product from a 
particular economy in a given year. Imports of services are excluded. From 1972 to 1988, 
products are primarily identified using the 7-digit Tariff Schedule for The United States, 
Annotated (TSUSA) number. Goods are identified using 10-digit Harmonized System 
(HS) codes from 1989 to 2001. As well as dollar denominated customs values for each 
instance of importing, the Census Bureau tracks quantities, units, country of origin, 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) rev.2 4-digit code, and other 
information. For inter-temporal comparability as well as concordance with GDP figures, I 
adjust nominal U.S. dollar customs values to base-year 2000 U.S. dollars, using 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2007). 
To arrive at each good‟s unit price (u) in equation 3, I divide an import‟s customs 
value by the quantity of units imported.4 This step demands the fine-grained detail 
provided by 7- and 10-digit product codes, since I derive q by comparing the prices of 
goods that are presumed to competitors. By contrast, aggregate sector- or industry-level 
classifications contain products that do not closely resemble each other. The comparison 
of unit prices of these dissimilar goods would create an uninterpretable relative price 
index. Nonetheless, the initial distribution of q remains implausibly wide, even at 7- and 
10-digit levels.  
Inaccuracies in record keeping may explain outliers in the distribution. An 
exploratory study finds significant error in U.S. import unit prices (General Accounting 
Office 1995). Implausible unit values could be the result of data entry errors, overly 
broad product classifications and other problems (ibid). I take several steps to minimize 
these errors, since they cannot be corrected ex post.5 Because 90% of the values of the 
                                                 
4
 Exporters may have multiple instances of exports of a product in a particular year. Of the 5,213,708 total 
records, 9% (463,761) are multiple country/product/year observations. Fortunately, multiples are in 
consistent unit types (for example: pounds or dozens) at the TSUSA or HS level. Hence, I collapse these 
instances into one observation per country/product/year, where the final unit price is a value-share weighted 
sum 
5
 Scholars doing related work have undertaken several strategies to address this problem. Khandelwal 
(2007) deletes all import instances with a value below $10,000 or quantity of 1, and also eliminates 
observations with unit prices below the 5
th
 and above the 95
th
 percentile within 5-digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) „sectors.‟ However, 5-digit SITC sectors contain varied products, 
Tom Kemeny – UCLA Dept of Urban Planning 
 
quality index are between the fairly reasonable bounds of 0.1 and 8.2 (the highest and 
lowest priced goods thereby differ by a factor of 82), I adjust only outliers that exert 
undue influence on country-level TECH scores.6 I set unit prices of country/product pairs 
whose quality scores are below the 1
st
 and above the 99
th
 percentile to the average unit 
price among all other exporters of the product. The distorting effect of these outliers is 
then eliminated, since the exporter‟s q value for the product becomes equal to 1.7 This 
method is relatively nondestructive, preserving the general effect of unit prices while 
making the least severe assumptions. I also set all q values for natural resource goods to 
1, thereby ensuring that these goods‟ product scores are unaffected by quality 
differences.8 Variability in international prices for natural resource imports should largely 
reflect comparative cost differences that are unrelated to technology. Initial and adjusted 
distributions of relative prices are shown in Table A2 of the data appendix. 
My measure diverges from the index proposed by Hausmann et al (2007) in 
additional ways. I recalculate a good‟s revealed sophistication (p) each year, using annual 
data on export shares and income, since the relatively long time period from which I 
construct TECH means that time-invariant product scores are inappropriate.9 I expect a 
good‟s level of sophistication to change over three decades, as products are rendered 
more complex, or are standardized. However, a product‟s score can fluctuate from year to 
year in ways that can reflect composition effects rather than technological shifts. To 
minimize these non-technological effects, I smooth p scores using a 5-year moving 
average.10 11 
                                                                                                                                                 
and as such it is too aggregated a level at which to make price comparisons. Moreover, we have no 
evidence that small-value or low-quantity imports are those records most likely to contain errors. Xu (2007) 
drops all observations below the 1
st
 and above the 99
th
 percentile within each product‟s Q distribution. To 
further reduce the effects of outliers, he adjusts Q by raising it to the power of  = 0.2, partly as a result of 
comparison with country-level R&D intensities, though the exponent remains somewhat arbitrary.  = 0.2 
indicates very low confidence in the quality of unit prices, so much so that it nearly eliminates the impact 
of quality differences entirely. 
6
 The true ceiling for any given product is likely to be smaller than a comparison of the highest to the 
lowest q scores. This is because a given pair of low and high scores need not correspond to the same good. 
7
 A very small number of unusually high, and temporally inconsistent TECH scores remain. I find that these 
outliers are undiversified exporters with one unusually high q score that pushes TECH to an unlikely level. 
I resolve this issue by investigating the outlier country‟s history of exporting the good whose q results in 
their high TECH score. I find that most outlier economies have no history of exporting the product in other 
years. I adjust its unit price to the average of remaining exporters of this good if the country has either 
never exported this good in other years, or has done so within a much more moderate range of q scores.  
8
 I define natural resources as goods with SITC rev.2 codes 0-4, and 9, not including 95  
9
 Hausmann et al (2007) create a singular, static PRODY score for each good as a 3 year average of the 
years 1999-2001, and apply this score backwards over 1992-2003.. 
10
 After experimenting with different formulae for smoothing, I arrived at the (1 1 3) approach, using the 
following formula: (1/5)*[x(t-1) + 1*x(t) + x(t+1) + x(t+2) + x(t+3)]; x(t)=p. This method struck the best 
balance between capturing trends in the p scores, while eliminating implausible variation. 
11
 I extensively correct the original U.S. import data series in order to ensure intertemporal comparability 
within individual products, within each series, 1972-1988 and 1989-2001. As noted in Feenstra et al (2002), 
the code used to identify a particular good may change from year to year. The same code is also 
occasionally used to identify different goods in different years. I also discovered that the original data 
includes what appear to be a single good coded differently even within the same year. Acetone, for 
example, appears as both TSUSA #4276000 and  #4066400 in 1988. I took several steps to resolve these 
issues. Primarily, I match products across time using their detailed alphabetic descriptions, after removing 
punctuation and other sources of error. Products were also matched according to their initial product codes, 
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Unlike Hausmann et al (2007), I also maximize the number of countries in each 
year instead of using a balanced panel.12 I do so for two main reasons. First, U.S. import 
data differs from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE) used by Hausmann et al (2007) in that it does not depend on voluntary 
reporting from exporters. Hence, the increasing group of countries reflects not declining 
nonreporting but actual growth in the diversity of sources of U.S. imports. Second, TECH 
results do not appreciably differ when built from the unbalanced panel. Hence, my data 
models exports from 115 countries for much of the period, expanding to 141 by 2001. 
My construction of TECH relies on the presumptions that exports reveal an 
economy‟s overall technological structure, and also that exports to the U.S. mirror 
economies‟ general patterns of world exports. Exports are widely held to be a reasonable 
indicator of the leading edge of domestic technological capabilities, since exports signal 
an economy‟s ability to competitively produce for the world market, while untraded or 
trade-protected goods may persist despite being of poor quality. Exports are a noisy, 
albeit superior signal of technology sophistication (Khan 2006).13  
At least two main forces support the relationship between U.S. exports and world 
trade patterns: the openness of the U.S. economy, as well as the attractiveness of its large 
market (Schott 2006). On the other hand, bilateral trade volumes decline with distance for 
several reasons (Anderson & van Wincoop 2004; McCallum 1995; Wei 1996), which 
might render the analogy less valid. To investigate this further, I build an additional 
version of the index using trade data the World Trade Flows (WTF) dataset.14 The two 
indices have a correlation coefficient of 0.86, and scatterplots at various cross-sections, 
shown in Figure A2 in the data appendix, generally support the use of U.S. imports as a 
proxy for world trade patterns more generally.  
                                                                                                                                                 
with non-matches manually identified and resolved using external sources. Products were assigned new, 
intertemporal consistent codes on the basis of these matches. Stata do-files to perform these actions are 
available upon request. 
12
 All exporting countries are included except OPEC nations. Because of their unusually high GDP as a 
result of petroleum exports, the OPEC countries apply undue leverage on the TECH distribution. Countries 
are listed in Table A1 of the data appendix. 
13
 One important element of the noise, both for export data generally, and specifically for the TECH index, 
is the rise of fragmented production processes documented in papers such as Hummels D, Ishii J, Yi KM. 
2001. The nature and growth of vertical specialization in world trade. Journal of International Economics 
54:75-96. TECH cannot account for the fact that an individual product imported into the U.S. may have 
been produced in a variety of economies, each performing different elements of the production process that 
reflect their diverse levels of sophistication. My index will assign the sophistication associated with this 
good to its „final‟ producer who exports the good to the U.S. (who may not be the actual final producer, in 
that a firm in the U.S. may add additional value to the good before exporting it elsewhere. The detailed 
product level data used to build TECH mitigates some of this issue: Imported parts will be as precisely 
identified as possible as being parts, rather than being confused with final, fully assembled goods which 
might occur at higher aggregation. However, we cannot know which other producing countries have also 
contributed to the product that is recorded as a U.S. import. 
14
 WTF records bilateral trade flows between over 100 countries from 1962 to 2000 at the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC), revision 2, 4-digit level. This data measures world trade flows as 
opposed to U.S. imports, but its products are classified at a yet more aggregated level (for full 
documentation, see Feenstra RC, Lipsey RE, Deng H, Ma AC, Mo H. 2005. World Trade Flows: 1962-
2000. NBER Working Paper 11040). I therefore construct country-level scores without quality adjustments. 
Such a quality adjustment is impossible in any case, since WTF contains price and quantity data for only 
selected records, and starting only in 1984. 
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Table 1 displays top and bottom 5 TECH scores in 1972 and 2001. Leaders in 
1972 are all high-income Western European economies. The least sophisticated 
economies include poor South Asian and African nations. This pattern repeats in 2001, 
with Ireland being added to the top 5. Those at the bottom are all African except 
Tajikistan.  
 
Table 1. Top and bottom countries in TECH, 1972 and 2001 
1972 2001 














As expected, there is a strong relationship between TECH and per capita GDP.15 
As Hausmann et al (2007) note however, GDP does not lead mechanically to a given 
TECH score, despite their interrelationship by construction. Independence between the 
two is even clearer in my index, given the distinct impact of unit prices. The effect of unit 
prices likely strengthens the connection between GDP and TECH however, since rich 
countries are those that export goods with high relative unit prices (Schott 2004). 
 
Table 2. Correlation between TECH and other technological measures 
 1990 2000 
 TECH TECH 
Higher Education
16
 0.72 0.64 
Patent 0.70 0.58 
Infrastructure 0.74 0.74 
TFP17 0.66 - 
 
 
                                                 
15
 TECH and PCGDP have an average annual correlation coefficient around 0.84. 
16
 Education, patent and infrastructure measures are taken from Archibugi and Coco (2004), where they are 
documented in more detail. Briefly, „Education‟ measures the share of students enrolled in tertiary study of 
social and physical science in the comparable age group. „Patent‟ describes the mean U.S.P.T.O.-filed 
patents per million inhabitants. „Infrastructure‟ is an unweighted average of population weighted measures 
of the penetration of internet, landline and cellular and electricity. 
17
 The measure of total factor productivity used comes from Hall RE, Jones CI. 1999. Why Do Some 
Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others? Technology 83. The authors 
disaggregate output per worker into measures of capital intensity, human capital per worker and 
productivity for the year 1988. Hence, the correlation in Table 2 is between TECH and TFP for 1988, for 
the 117 economies in both data sets.  Each economy‟s TFP is calculated as a ratio of the U.S. value. 
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Table 2 demonstrates TECH‟s association with 3 different measures of 
„technological capability‟ outlined in Archibugi and Coco (2004), as well as a measure of 
TFP. Interestingly, while coefficients remain similar across time for measures of 
educational attainment and technological infrastructure, the association with patents 
weakens in 2000. Scatterplots of the relationship between TECH and the measure of 
patents mostly confirms the ineffectiveness of the latter as a meaningful measure of 
technological advancement across countries at a diverse range of incomes. Simply, only 
advanced economies patent in any significant quantity in 1990 as well as in 2000. 
TECH‟s somewhat diminished correlation with the measure of tertiary science and 
engineering education also points to an anomaly, as a handful of very small economies 
whose TECH scores reflect their lack of diversification bias the correlation.18 The last row 
in the table indicates a moderately high correlation between TFP and TECH in 1988. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4a. Technology Gaps Have Not Diminished Among U.S. Trading Partners 
Technology‟s geography is strikingly uneven. Of the 141 countries for which I 
build TECH scores in 2001, only 53 are above the mean level of technology. These 53 
nations contribute 66% of the total TECH among all U.S. trading partners, yet they 
consist of only 21% of the world‟s population.19 Technological differences are in fact 
starker than this snapshot reveals. The 15 most sophisticated economies in 2001 have a 
25% share of the globe‟s total technology while representing only 5% of its population. 
This gap between advanced and unsophisticated exporters is not a recent 
development. Table 3 describes the TECH distribution at several cross-sections.  Mean 
sophistication has steadily increased from 1972 to 2001, consistent with generalized 
technological progress. That median scores are consistently below the mean confirms that 
most economies start and remain less sophisticated than the world average. The standard 
deviation of the distribution has increased, suggesting a growing spread in the range of 
TECH values. The fourth and fifth rows of the table display averages of the top and 
bottom 5 economies‟ TECH scores. While sophistication levels of the leading countries 
nearly doubles from 1972 to 2001, scores of the least advanced economies remain 
roughly stagnant. Ratios of the 5 highest to 5 lowest TECH scores show that the most 
sophisticated economies are 13 times as advanced as those at the bottom in 1972, but they 
become 25 times as advanced by the end of the period. Hence, the gap between these 
least and most advanced economies grows by a factor of 1.88 over the 30-year period. 
Interestingly, most of this change occurs in the 1990s.20 Together, this evidence suggests 
that technological differences as measured by TECH are substantial, and they have 
grown. 
                                                 
18
 See Figures B1-B3 in the appendix for the relevant plots 
19
 This considers the 141 countries in the TECH index to be the world, and excludes the U.S., which does 
not import to itself.  
20
 The year 2001 is not an outlier: the large increase in the gap between the tails of the distribution starts in 
1991, and progresses through the decade. The average annual ratio between 1991 and 2001 is 21. The 
explanation appears to be an absolute decline of a number of African and Asian economies, combined with 
superior growth among the world‟s technological leaders. Moreover, the gap is not simply an artifact of a 
few poorly performing economies. The gap grows by a factor of 1.75 when we compare top and bottom 10 
economies between 1972 and 2001, and by a factor of 1.4 for the top and bottom 20. 
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This suggestion of a widening gap between advanced and unsophisticated 
economies accords with evidence from the distribution of per capita incomes. However, 
the growing gap between the richest and poorest countries is significantly greater, almost 
doubling from 33 to 64 over the study period. The dynamics of the distribution of global 
sophistication broadly parallel, but are more constrained than that of income.21  
 
Table 3. Indicators of Catch-up in Technological Sophistication, 1972-2001 
 1972 1980 1990 2001 
Mean 5,783.57 7,139.90 8,705.64 10,772.80 
Median 4,513.60 5,663.50 6,266.00 8,163.30 
Standard Deviation 4,177.76 4,939.10 6,513.90 7,729.33 
Most Sophisticated* 17,068.77 20,660.98  
26,627.01 
32,127.92 
Least Sophisticated* 1,280.62 1,555.22  1,673.58 1,281.00 
Ratio of highest to lowest* 13.3 13.3 15.9 25.08 
Coefficient of variation 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.72 
Gini coefficient 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.39 
*Average of top and bottom 5 observations 
 
 
The final rows in Table 3 apply common metrics of statistical dispersion to 
TECH: the coefficient of variation and the Gini coefficient. TECH‟s coefficient of 
variation will equal zero if all economies share the same level of technological 
sophistication, while higher values indicate greater spread among country technology 
levels. Gini coefficients range between 0 and 1. A value of zero means that countries 
share equally in the total TECH available in the world. TECH scores maintain a 
consistent coefficient of variation, ranging from 0.69 to 0.75. The Gini coefficient for 
TECH is similarly invariant. These „dimensionless‟ indices suggest that the scale of gaps 
between advanced and less sophisticated economies remain in 2001 as they began in 
1972. 
The results in Table 3 therefore provide contradictory-seeming evidence on the 
evolution of technology gaps. Increases over time in the standard deviation and the ratio 
of the most to the least sophisticated economies suggest growing gaps, at least between 
the tails of the population of countries.22 By contrast, the Gini and coefficient of variation 
point to relative stability in the overall spread of TECH.  
These measures alone fail to capture the complexity of changing technology gaps, 
since very different distributions can share the same descriptive statistics and measures of 
inequality. The Gaussian kernel-smoothed density plot in Figure 1 provides a more 
multidimensional representation of TECH‟s morphology between 1972 and 2001.23 This 
                                                 
21
 This may be partly by construction since PRODY scores are weighted averages of income levels. 
However, the independent impact from relative prices (Q) ensures that this difference is not mechanical. 
22
 It is important to remember that the countries described in this analysis do not represent a random 
sample. The idea is not to be able to generalize from the countries examined here to an overall population. 
Though not entirely complete (for example, the U.S. is notably absent, since it does not export to itself), the 
collection of countries is conceptually closer to the actual global population of nations. 
23
 To ensure that I have not chosen anomalous years, I also generate kernel-smoothed densities using 3-year 
averages of TECH (1972-74; 1979-81; 1989-1991; 1999-01). I do not report these here since the results are 
almost indistinguishable. 
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image can help to reconcile constant inequality levels with the growing gap between the 
most and least sophisticated economies.  
The horizontal axis of Figure 1 gauges absolute TECH scores, while the vertical 
axis describes the number of economies at a given technology level. I highlight three 
main results. First, the dominant peak in the distribution is found at TECH‟s low end. By 
contrast, only a small number of economies appear highly sophisticated. This general 
imbalance holds throughout the 30-year period. Second, the positive skew evident in the 
distribution in 1972 has strongly and steadily increased into 2001. I interpret this to mean 
that there has been a significant expansion of the technological frontier, although the 
density of countries occupying high-sophistication positions remains low. Third, while 
the club of less advanced countries remains numerically dominant, its shape has been 
transformed. Specifically, it has shifted from a dense peak with a steep drop-off on either 
side to a wider and lower mode that contains countries with a more diverse range of 
technology levels. The decreased height suggests that membership in the club of 
unsophisticated economies has steadily shrunk. The increase in the peak‟s breadth means 
that there is growing heterogeneity in this peak. As well as poor economies towards the 
left, the mode contains middle-sophistication economies by the end of the 1990s. By 
2001, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Philippines, Malaysia as well as a number of post-communist 
transition economies have upgraded their technological sophistication, and they approach 
the sophistication level of a number of OECD economies.24  
 
Figure 1. Absolute densities of TECH values, n=115 (141 in 2001) 
 
                                                 
24
 The lack of service trade data may understate Hong Kong‟s and some other countries‟ true scores. 
Tom Kemeny – UCLA Dept of Urban Planning 
 
 
This picture is irreducible to a story of simple technological convergence or 
divergence. The real gap between the most and least sophisticated economies has 
increased over the period, mostly as a result of expansion in technological sophistication 
levels at the top end. This is consistent with the results shown in the upper and middle 
rows of Table 3. At the same time, most economies with low initial TECH scores have 
upgraded the sophistication of their exports, and the changing shape of the dominant peak 
provides evidence that a group of „middle sophistication‟ countries has emerged. So 
Figure 1 suggests stagnation at the bottom, moderate upgrading in the middle, and rapid 
expansion of technology levels among technological leaders.  
The statistics presented thus far treat each economy as an undifferentiated point. 
Figure 2 shows absolute kernel density estimates that weight each economy according to 
its population size. I truncate results along the horizontal axis at TECH<=15,000 to aid 
interpretation of the lower end, since above a threshold of 15,000 the plot generally 
conforms to the unweighted diagram shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 therefore focuses on the 
unsophisticated economies, where the bulk of the world‟s population resides. The left 
panel of the figure shows results from all economies below the cutoff. It shows that 
economies housing a large proportion of the world‟s population have increased their 
sophistication between 1972 and 2001. Moreover, the shape of the distribution changes 
from a single dominant mode to a „twin peaks‟ form between 1980 and 1990. In 1972 the 
single peak is primarily composed of China, India, Brazil and Indonesia, who together 
consist of over 50% of the population of all economies for which I have data. By 1980, 
Brazil accelerates out of this group, and can subsequently be discerned in smaller peaks 
around 6,500 (1980), 9,100 (1990), and 11,000 (2001). However, the other economies 
remain. In 1990, the emergence of a bimodal shape is explained by India‟s comparatively 
more rapid technological upgrading. It dominates the mode centered on 7,000, while 
China and Indonesia remain around their scores in 1980. This same pattern repeats in 
2001. 
The right panel of Figure 2 displays the same kernel density estimates but omits 
results from China and India. To facilitate comparison, both panels use the same scale. 
This figure demonstrates to what extent the changes seen on the left are explained by the 
development of China and India. Lacking those giant economies, whose combined 
population in 2001 represents 47% of the economies for which I have TECH data, there is 
evidence of a modest reduction in the most unsophisticated mode and a similarly small 
increase in a second, somewhat less advanced club. Technological upgrading in the 
context of China and India‟s massive populations push forward the peak of relatively 
unsophisticated economies over time.  
 
Figure 2. Population-weighted absolute densities of TECH, truncated sample 




It should be cautioned that Figure 2 depends on the assumption that technology is 
evenly distributed within country populations. This is unlikely, especially in countries 
like China and India, where highly uneven income distributions hint at a wide disparity in 
technological advancement. Xu (2007) investigates China‟s technological inequality 
further, noting that Chinese exporting regions have per capita incomes that are between 
1.3 to 4.5 times higher than the national average in 2004. Nonetheless, Figure 2 provides 
some sense of the effect of China and India‟s rise, even while it is overstated by 
distributional assumptions. 
 
4b. Technology Positions Are Stable Over Time 
The preceding analysis could characterize a distribution in which countries hold 
their relative positions over time as much as one where they switch places. Do economies 
that start out unsophisticated in 1972 remain so in 2001? Do technological leaders at the 
beginning of the period persevere at the end? More generally, do we see 
intradistributional stability or churning over time?  
I explore this first using a random effects growth model in which I predict change 
in TECH as a function of time in years.25 Ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions are 
inapplicable here, since a each country‟s results across time are often serially correlated. 
A random effects model permits me to estimate the relationship between time and change 
                                                 
25
 Output shown in Appendix B. I ran the random effects specification after performing the Hausman test, 
which confirms the null hypothesis that both the random effects and fixed effects are consistent but random 
effects is efficient. 
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in technological sophistication, controlling for countries‟ different technological starting 
points. Using this model I find a positive, statistically significant (p=0.000) relationship 
between time in years and TECH. With each additional year, the model predicts an 
associated increase in TECH of 176.4 (hence 30-year growth is estimated at 5,292). This 
estimation approach also measures intraclass correlation, or rho: the association between 
observations on the same unit, as compared with observations from other economies.  
Rho values close to zero indicate that observations on a single country across time are no 
more similar to each other than cases from all other countries. Conversely, values near 
one indicate that cases from a single country are more similar than cases from other 
countries. My rho estimate of 0.83 means that countries that begin with high TECH 
scores continue to enjoy high scores over time. As well, countries with low scores persist 
in their low levels of technological sophistication over the 30-year period. 
This provides general evidence in favor of temporal stability in relative 
technological positions, but few details. To investigate further, I plot TECH values from 
the beginning of the study period against positions at the end in Figure 3.26 I also display 
two interpretative aids: a linear fit line, as well as a line at 45˚. Data points below the 
dashed 45˚ line have diminished their sophistication in real terms. Almost all countries 
remain above 45˚, which confirms the secular upward trend in levels of technological 
sophistication between 1972 and 2001 found in the random effects model. Only a handful 
of economies have suffered an absolute decrease in their technological capabilities.  
The solid linear fit line predicts a relationship between starting and ending TECH 
scores using ordinary least squares. Economies directly on the linear fit line are those 
whose starting TECH score perfectly predict their technology level in 2001. Economies 
below the solid line have dropped down the ladder of technological sophistication relative 
to their peers, while those above have leapfrogged. 
Figure 3 corroborates the general story of positional stability drawn from the 
random effects estimate. Starting and ending TECH scores are highly correlated, with a 
coefficient of 0.89. The strength of this relationship is clearest among countries with low 
and moderate initial levels of technology. These economies remain in roughly the same 
low and moderate positions in which they began. Above an initial TECH score of 7,000, 
the results are mixed. While all of these economies have grown in absolute terms, they 
have larger deviations from the linear estimate. Denmark, Ireland and Finland and a few 
others have upgraded their export sophistication at a rate notably higher than the entire 
distribution‟s linear fit. By contrast, Switzerland, Bermuda and Germany have grown 
more slowly than the trend. However, even if these countries have underperformed 
relative to the average annual growth trend, they remain among the most advanced 
economies in 2001. 
 
 
Figure 3. 3-year Average TECH, 1972-74 against 1999-2001 
                                                 
26
 To ensure that 1972 and 2001 are not idiosyncratic years, I graph a 3-year average of 1972 to 1974, 
against average scores from 1999 to 2001 




 Some economies that began in 1972 at low and moderate TECH levels appear to 
have leapt forward by century‟s end. Among low scorers, Mali, and Somalia have 
increased their TECH scores at a substantially faster rate than the norm. In both cases 
however, their strong growth is an artifact of the indicator‟s construction, as well as being 
sensitive to the number of years used to create starting and ending averages for Figure 3. 
Mali, for example has shifted from a revealed comparative advantage in „Food and live 
animals chiefly for food‟ (Class 0, 1-digit SITC) in 1972, to a focus in 2001 on 
“Miscellaneous manufacturing” (class 8) and “Machinery and transport equipment” 
(Class 7). Yet it‟s apparent leap forward in Figure 3, like Somalia‟s is more a function of 
its small export basket being dominated by a few goods, which in selected years enjoy 
surprisingly high comparative unit prices.27 Among larger economies, this effect, possibly 
a function of data entry error would be filtered out, but in these small economies it is 
magnified.  
 Among moderate initial TECH scores, Singapore, Malta, Cyprus and Ireland have 
outperformed their peers. Malta‟s score appears to be largely due to their small 
economy‟s emergent specialization in electronic integrated circuits, sold at a price 
premium, and occupying close to half of its U.S. exports at century‟s end. Ireland and 
                                                 
27
 For example, 42% of Mali‟s export basket in 2001 are of wheeled toys with a Q near 1, while in 1999 
this good occupies only 1.5% of total exports while being sold at a Q value of almost 40. This dramatic 
compositional shift is partly a function of undiversified exports. One wonders whether or not this case is 
also exacerbated by the use of U.S. import data rather than total Malian exports to the world. 
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Singapore however appear to reflect more diversified shifts towards high sophistication. 
75% of Singapore‟s U.S. exports are focused on various kinds of machinery and transport 
equipment throughout the 30-year period. It‟s focus shifts however, from cathode ray 
tubes, photocells, radio broadcast receivers, diodes and transistors in 1972, to hard disk 
drives and other computer components by 2001, the latter composing part of a highly 
diversified export basket consisting of almost 2400 distinct goods.  
 
Figure 4. Real change in TECH, balanced panel 
 
  
 It appears that some of the cases described above are instances of switching 
successfully from one „category‟ of sophistication to another. As Figure 3 demonstrates, 
this phenomenon is not widespread.  But some mobility patterns are evident in the 
distribution. Economies above initial TECH of 7,000 have fairly consistently grown 
faster than the linear estimate. Figure 4 makes this point clearly, by plotting starting and 
end TECH scores for all countries for which I have complete 30-year results. There is a 
strong relationship between initial TECH levels and subsequent growth. A few lower 
TECH economies have made large gains, and some higher-TECH economies have 
upgraded their sophistication less quickly, but the general trend is towards reinforcing the 
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4c. Winners win by producing the same goods better, and more intensively 
Determining the precise nature of shifts in an economy‟s TECH score remains 
difficult because it is a function of as many as 15,000 different products it may export at 
any given moment. Moreover, each good‟s contribution to TECH depends on its relative 
quality, implied productivity, and its share of total exports, each also changing from one 
year to the next. Despite this challenge, we want to know why the initially 
technologically advanced economies appear to be those that have most significantly 
upgraded their sophistication between 1972 and 2001. Have they, for example, engaged 
in systematic quality upgrading, or have they grown as a function of adding new products 
to their repertoires? Moreover, have these high-performing economies increased the 
sophistication of their exports in a coherent way, or are their upgrading experiences 
idiosyncratic? Among late-industrializing economies we might want to know why 
Singapore and Ireland have performed particularly well, while others continue to lag 
behind – including some like Hong Kong whose per capita GDP has grown dramatically 
over the period studied.  
To answer these questions, I unpack year-on-year changes in TECH into distinct 
contributions from changes in quality and greater implied productivity, in export shares, 
and from the addition of new products and the elimination of old ones. I adapt a method 
proposed by Foster et al (1998) to capture these distinct shifts, such that the change in 
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The first two terms consider „within-product‟ effects. The first term captures 
overall contribution from quality upgrading (q), holding all else constant, for products an 
economy continues to export in adjacent paired years (

gC). The second term measures 
adjacent-year changes in TECH that are due to changes in the implied productivity (p) of 
products an economy exports, all else equal. Third comes the „between-product‟ 
component, which quantifies the contribution of changes in export basket composition 
among consistently exported goods. The next two terms are covariance or cross terms 
that permit the separation of between- and within- (q and p) effects.29 The fourth term 
measures the covariance of implied productivity and export share, holding quality 
constant. The fifth describes the covariance of quality and export share, holding implied 
productivity constant. Sixth, the „product-entry‟ component measures the impact on 
TECH as an economy adds new goods that it did not export in an earlier year, holding all 
                                                 
28
 Foster et al (1998) review literature that seeks to measure productivity differences among plants in the 
same industry. Hence, the authors decompose a given industry‟s productivity level into contributions as 
individual plants become more or less productive, as well a contributions as plants occupy varying market 
shares. In the case of TECH, we need a second-order decomposition: not only between changes in export 
shares and product characteristics, but also between implied sophistication and quality, within individual 
product values. 
29
 In earlier iterations, I decomposed changes in TECH using between and within terms that held the other 
constant using averages across periods. While this eliminates the covariance term, the within-component 
still contains some impact  from export reallocation, and vice versa.  
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else equal.30  Last, the „product-exit‟ component explains the effect on TECH as an 
economy stops exporting goods that it exported in an earlier year, again holding all else 
equal.31  
The between-product, exit and entry terms include deviations of individual 
country/product sophistication (pq) from the overall country TECH score. For the 
between-product term, this means a shift in export share will contribute positively only 
when the goods towards which the economy is being shifted have an above-average level 
of implied productivity. Similarly, a product‟s entry or exit drives a change in TECH only 
insofar as the goods added or subtracted diverge from the country‟s initial level of 
sophistication.  
 




I decompose annual changes in each country‟s TECH between 1972 and 2001. 
Since the U.S. import data switches from the TSUSA to the HS product coding systems 
in 1989, I cannot account for changes between 1988 and 1989. To begin exploring these 
decompositions, I compare percentage contributions from the components of growth in 
TECH from Singapore and Hong Kong in Figure 5. Both are Asian „Tigers‟ that 
experienced rapid income growth over the period studied. The decision to examine these 
countries is also guided by the fact that Singapore is among the fastest-upgrading 
economies, with an average annual growth in TECH of 332.3 as compared with a „world‟ 
                                                 
30
 E is the set of goods that an economy exports in t but not t-1. 
31
 L is the set of goods that an economy exports in t-1 but not t 
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average of 201.3, while Hong Kong‟s annual growth is below average, registering only 
147.4. 
Figure 5 reveals notable differences in each economy‟s upgrading pattern. Hong 
Kong appears to have decreased its quality levels, while slightly shifting its attention to 
goods with higher implied productivity. It also displays a strong positive contribution 
from the covariance term between quality and export share. That is, the goods for which 
Hong Kong has performed quality upgrading, it has also exported more intensively. 
For Singapore, between-product and net entry components dominate. Singapore 
has increased its TECH score by changing the composition of exports towards goods that 
it produces in higher quality, or which have greater implied productivity. It has also 
undergone notable structural change towards new goods that enhance the overall 
sophistication of its export basket.  
To get a clearer sense of the regularities in technological upgrading, I create 4 
country groups on the basis TECH scores in 1972. Countries in the most advanced group 
have initial TECH scores above twice the mean score in that year. The upper-middle 
group consists of countries with initial TECH scores greater than or equal to the mean 
and less than twice the mean. Economies in the lower-middle group have TECH scores 
below the mean and above half the mean. Those in the least advanced group have starting 
TECH scores below half the 1972 mean. These groups were chosen since they broadly 
conform to components of the kernel density plots, in particular separating the high-
performing economies as a distinct group.32 To ensure that these groups are significantly 
different from each other, I perform a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) using 
countries‟ 28-year average 

TECH.  The test reveals that the groups have significantly 
different mean changes in TECH, with an associated p-value=0.000. 
Table 4 shows each group‟s percentage contributions from each decomposed 
component, with a single net entry term that summarizes the effect of both entry and 
entry. It also displays means for the average change in TECH for each group. Entries in 
the table represent 28-year averages, since I cannot account for changes between 1971 
and 1972, or between 1988 and 1989. I present results from a balanced panel to ensure 
that country-group contributions equal each group‟s average 

TECH.  
The bottom row of Table 4 confirms that those economies that start off with high 
TECH scores in 1972 have, on average, grown the most over the subsequent 30-year 
period. Average growth in TECH diminishes systematically with a disadvantaged starting 
point. Moreover, the initially advanced group has grown in common ways. Among 
consistently exported goods, they show large contributions from quality upgrading, from 
increases in the implied productivity, and from increasing their focus on more advanced 
goods. By contrast, their contribution from net entry is small. The trend as we move to 
less initially-sophisticated countries moves in the opposite direction. Less-sophisticated 
economies have a greater contribution from the addition of more sophisticated goods that 
they did not produce in the past. They only engage in limited quality upgrading within 
goods, and somewhat more from the export of goods whose implied productivity has 
risen. 
 
                                                 
32
 Results using groups formed from initial-TECH quartiles did not importantly differ but were less 
preferable for substantive reasons. To see a kernel density plot with the groups explicitly marked, see Table 
B5 in the appendix. 
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Table 4.  Decomposition of TECH into percentage contributions from within, between, 
covariance, and net entry components for initial TECH groups 








 (n=31)  
Quality 32%  42%  8%  10% 
Implied productivity 37% 31% 33% 29% 
Between-product
- 102%  111%  44% -4%  
Covariance ∆q∆x -85%   -110%  -40%  -3% 
Covariance ∆p∆x 7% -5% -13% -24% 
Net Entry  6% 30%   68%  92% 





My results show that technology gaps have not shrunk in the age of globalization. 
By constructing an index that measures an economy‟s technological sophistication as a 
function of the products it exports, as well as the quality levels of those goods relative to 
competing exporters, I have traced complex patterns in international technology gaps 
between 1972 and 2001. I provide evidence that while some less advanced economies 
have upgraded their technology levels during this period, it is the most advanced 
economies that have built on their initial lead at a faster rate, and they have done so in 
similar ways. Overall, I provide some initial confirmation that specialization in high-
sophistication goods spurs a circular and cumulative technological advantage that 
outweighs the increasing facility of codified information transmission as a means of 
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Table A1. Exporting countries in TECH 
Country CODE Country CODE Country CODE Country CODE Country CODE 
AFGHAN AFG COS_RICA CRI ICELAND ISL MONGOLA MNG SRI_LKA LKA 
ALBANIA ALB CROATIA HRV INDIA IND MOROCCO MAR ST_K_NEV KNA 
ANGOLA AGO CYPRUS CYP INDONES IDN MOZAMBQ MOZ SUDAN SDN 
ARGENT ARG CZECHO CZK IRELAND IRL MRITIUS MUS SURINAM SUR 
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ARMENIA ARM CZECHREP CZE ISRAEL ISR NEPAL NPL SWEDEN SWE 
AUSTRAL AUS C_AFRICA CAF ITALY ITA NETHLDS NLD SWITZLD CHE 
AUSTRIA AUT DENMARK DNK IVY_CST CIV NEW_GUIN PNG S_AFRICA ZAF 
AZERBAIJ AZE DJIBOUTI DJI JAMAICA JAM NEW_ZEAL NZL TAIWAN TWN 
BAHAMAS BHS DOM_REP DOM JAPAN JPN NICARAGA NIC TAJIKIST TJK 
BARBADO BRB ECUADOR ECU JORDON JOR NIGER NER TANZANIA TZA 
BELARUS BLR EGYPT EGY KAZAKHST KAZ NORWAY NOR THAILAND THA 
BELIZE BLZ EQ_GNEA GNQ KENYA KEN PAKISTAN PAK TOGO TGO 
BEL_LUX BGM ESTONIA EST KIRIBATI KIR PANAMA PAN TRINIDAD TTO 
BENIN BEN ETHIOPIA ETH KOREA_S KOR PARAGUA PRY TUNISIA TUN 
BERMUDA BMU FIJI FJI KYRGYZST KGZ PERU PER TURKEY TUR 
BNGLDSH BGD FINLAND FIN LAO LAO PHIL PHL TURKMENI TKM 
BOLIVIA BOL FRANCE FRA LATVIA LVA POLAND POL UGANDA UGA 
BOSNIA-H BIH GAMBIA GMB LEBANON LBN PORTUGAL PRT UKINGDOM GBR 
BRAZIL BRA GEORGIA GEO LIBERIA LBR ROMANIA ROU UKRAINE UKR 
BULGARIA BGR GERMAN DEU LITHUANI LTU RUSSIA RUS URUGUAY URY 
BURKINA BFA GHANA GHA MACAU MAC RWANDA RWA UZBEKIST UZB 
BURUNDI BDI GREECE GRC MACEDONI MKD SALVADR SLV VIETNAM VNM 
CAMBOD KHM GUATMALA GTM MADAGAS MDG SAMOA WSM ZAIRE ZAI 
CAMEROON CMR GUINEA GIN MALAWI MWI SENEGAL SEN ZAMBIA ZMB 
CANADA CAN GUYANA GUY MALAYSIA MYS SIER_LN SLE ZIMBABWE ZWE 
CHAD TCD G_BISAU GNB MALI MLI SINGAPR SGP   
CHILE CHL HAITI HTI MALTA MLT SLOVAKIA SVK   
CHINA CHN HONDURA HND MAURITN MRT SLOVENIA SVN   
COLOMBIA COL HONGKONG HKG MEXICO MEX SOMALIA SOM   
















Figure A2. Scatterplots of U.S. Import and WTF-derived EXPY scores, selected years 







Table A2.  Distribution of unadjusted and adjusted Q scores 
 Unadjusted Q  Adjusted Q 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Percentiles Smallest 5  Percentiles Smallest 5 
1% 0.013 1.00E-07  0.0333766 4.97E-04 
5% 0.103 1.07E-07  0.136158 5.31E-04 
10% 0.229 1.31E-07  0.2678799 6.95E-04 
25% 0.588 1.83E-07  0.628105 7.75E-04 
      
50% 1.000   1.000  
  Largest 5   Largest 5 
75% 1.599 34468.98  1.563246 767.838 
90% 4.106 35220.6  3.82981 878.9839 
95% 8.256 39357.46  7.090668 928.3124 




Figure B1. TECH and TFP in 1988 
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Figure B2. 1972 Kernel Density Plot with TECH Decomposition Groups  
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